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Clayson devotes many pages of his Brief to establish that he put time, money and
effort into refurbishing the cheese plant. That is not disputed by Zebe and Lawson. Zebe
and Lawson did not argue in Appellants' Brief on Appeal that Clayson did not put time,
money and effort into refurbishing the cheese plant. Zebe's and Lawson's argument is that
they are not liable to Clayson for that time, money-and effort because, among other things,
Zebe and Lawson did not own the cheese plant and restaurant when the improvements were
made to it and when they bought the cheese plant and restaurant from a third party they paid
for the improvements.
CLAYSON REFURBISHED THE CHEESE PLANT BECAUSE OF PROlVIISES BY
FARINELLA, NOT BECAUSE OF PROMISES BY ZEBE AND LAWSON

Farinella owned the cheese plant when Clayson made the improvements for which he
now seeks payment. In fact, Clayson makes it clear in his Brief that what he did, he did
because of promises made by Farinella, not because of promises made by Zehe and Lawson:
1.

The owner [Farinella] told Mr. Clayson that he could do whatever he wanted
to get the plant ready to reopen as long as it didn't cost the owner or
bankruptcy court anything. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17)

2.

He [Farinella] promised Mr. Clayson he would clear title to the plant and make
it possible for Mr. Clayson to buy the plant. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17)

3.

Mr. Clayson, relying on the promise of the owner [Farinella] worked all

smmner and fall and spent substantial funds to refurbish the plant and get it
ready to reopen. (Appellee's Brief, p. 17)
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THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS CONTRACT TO
REIMBURSE CLAYSON

The trial court determined on motion for summary judgment that there was no
partnership agreement between the parties and there was no express contract between the
parties which would support a legal obligation on the part of Zebe and Lawson to reimburse
Clayson for refurbishment expenses he incurred because of promises from Farinella. (R.
Vol. 2, pp. 251 - 258) Therefore, in order to recover againstZebe and Lawson, Clayson had
to prove either a contract implied-in-fact or a contract implied-in-law. Contracts implied-infact and implied-in-law are two different and distinct concepts.
EQUITY DOES NOT INTERVENE WITH AN IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT
WHEN AN EXPRESS CONTRACT COVERS THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER

Clayson agrees 1 that an implied-in-fact contract requires evidence which supports the
dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the requesting party

promised payment. The trial court and Clayson agree that Clayson did not refurbish the
cheese plant at the request of Zebe or Lawson or in reliance on a promise that Zebe and
Lawson would pay for it.

(R. Vol. 4, p. 738; Appellee's Brief, pp. 17 - 18) Instead, the

trial court concluded, and Clayson argues in Appellee's Brief, that the obligation to pay
Clayson arose as follows:

1

Clayson actually misquotes the decision in Fox v. Mt. W Elec., 137 Idaho 703, 708
(Idaho 2002), but the substance of Clayson's argument makes it clear that he agrees that both
elements of the dual inference must be present.
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The Court finds that an implied-in-fact contract exists because Defendants
conduct and statements create an implied agreement to pay Clayson's
refurbishment expenses when he transferred operation of the Plant and
restaurant to Defendants on October 8, 2008.
(R. Vol. 4, p. 739; Appellee's Brief, p. 18)
The trial court should not have imposed an implied agreement because there was an
enforceable-written agreementcovering the same subject matter, i.e. the assignment which
Clayson executed on November 4, 2008. (Exhibit N)

The sequence of events which

occurred beginning on October 8, 2008, is important. On October 8, 2009, Clayson
relinquished his continued participation in the business. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732; Tr. Vol. 248, LL
11 - 24) From October 8 forward Clayson left the premises, had no further involvement in
SVC, and did not do any further work on the Plant. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732) The SVC articles
were amended shortly thereafter to delete Clayson as a member. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732) On
October 17, 2008, Clayson and Randall signed a written offer to purchase the Plant from Star
Valley Cheese, Inc. [Farinella] for $800,000. (R. Vol. 4, p. 732; Exhibit D) The offer
included all of the work that Clayson had contracted others to do, all of the materials that
Clayson had requested others to supply, all of the buildings, all of the improvements, all of
the property and all of the personal property Farinella, or his company, owned, in its then
condition for a purchase price of $800,000. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 249, L 4 - p. 251, L 10) On
November 4, 2008, Clayson assigned all his right, title and interest in the purchase and sale
agreement to SVC, LLC. Zebe and Lawson were the only members of SVC at the time of
the assignment. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 253, LL 11 - 25; Exhibit N) Clayson tried to get Zebe and
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Lawson to agree to reimburse him for the refurbishment expenses before he would sign the
assignment. Zebe and Lawson refused, but Clayson signed the assigmnent "without any
agreement on that day that he would be reimbursed." (R. Vol. 4, p. 734; Tr. Vol. II, p. 481,
L4-p.482,L14)
"Equity does not intervene when an express contract prescribes the right to
compensation." Vande,ford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 54 7, 55 8 (Idaho 2007); Shacocass,
Inc. v. Arrington Constr. Co., 116 Idaho 460, 464 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989); Wolford v.
Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064 (Idaho 1984) (when the express agreement is found to be

enforceable a court is precluded from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment
in contravention of the express contract)

Clayson argues that it makes no sense that he

would relinquish his interest in the LLC and assign his interest in the purchase and sale
agreement unless some promise had been made to him. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 17 - 18)
However, under the circumstances in this case equity should not have intervened to alter the
poor bargain Clayson made for himself.
Both Clayson and the trial court ignore the assignment by which Clayson assigned his
interest in the purchase and sale agreement to an LLC in which he was not a member:
Gaylen W. Clayson and Jeff Randall hereby assign all rights of said Contract
to buy and Sell Real Estate to SVC, LLC a Wyoming LLC.
Exhibit N
By the assignment, Clayson relinquished any rights he had in the improvements. He
had made those improvements for Farinella and after Clayson assigned the purchase and sale
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agreement to Zebe and Lawson, Farinella was free to sell and Zebe and Lawson were free
to buy the improvements without any further contractual obligation to pay Clayson. Courts
do not possess the roving power to rewrite contracts in order to make them more equitable.

Lavey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 139 Idaho 37, 41 (Idaho 2003) That, however, is
precisely_what the trial court did when it decided that in consideration for Clayson assigning
his interest in the purchase and sale agreement he was entitled to be paid for refurbishing the
property. (R. Vol. 2, p. 255) Clayson relinquished that entitlement when he signed the
assignment.
ZEBEANDLAWSONWERENOTUNJUSTLYENRICHEDBECAUSETHEYPAID
$800,000 FOR THE PROPERTY WHICH INCLUDED CLAYSON'S
IMPROVEMENTS

Clayson argues on appeal that he conferred value on Zebe and Lawson by introducing
them to the "opportunity" and that the "value" of the "opportunity" was Clayson's cost of
perfonning the refurbishments. (Appellee's Brief, p. 19)
The trial court did not find that the benefit was the "opportunity" nor did it value the
"oppmiunity" that Clayson now claims he bestowed on Zebe and Lawson. Clayson had the
burden of proving that Zebe and Lawson received a benefit and of proving the amount of
the benefit which Zebe and Lawson unjustly retained. Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147
Idaho 378, 389 (Idaho 2009)

The trial court found the "benefit" was the improvements

Clayson made to the restaurant and plant. The trial court found that on October 8 , 2008,
Zebe and Lawson "took over a Plant and restaurant that was better than it had been before
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Clayson's efforts and expenses." (R. Vol. 4, pp. 739 - 740) However, on October 8, 2008,
Zebe and Lawson did not own anything so they did not and could not receive or accept the
improvements. Zebe and Lawson had to purchase the improvements.
Zebe and Lawson did not own anything until the October 17, 2008 purchase and sale
agreement was assigned to them onNovember 4, 2008, and closed by them on February 24,
2009, when Zebe and Lawson paid $800,000. The trial court and Clayson ignore that Zebe
and Lawson paid for the improvements - they did not receive or accept anything without
paying for it. Logically, one can assume that if Clayson had not improved the property it
would have sold for less than $800,000. It is equally logical that the only person or entity
which benefitted was Farinella or his business entity. That, however, does not give rise to
an implied-in-law contract requiring Zebe and Lawson to reimburse Clayson for unjust
enrichment.

ZEBE'S POST-ASSIGNMENT STATEMENTS DO NOT GIVE RISE TO AN
OBLIGATION TO PAY CLAYSON
To the extent that Clayson and the trial court rely on Zebe's statements that he would
pay Clayson something for his efforts before the assignment was signed on November 4,
2008, any legal or equitable liability to pay Clayson was extinguished by the tenns of the
assignment. Clayson assigned all right, title and interest in the contract to buy the property
where he made the improvements. The trial court did not find the tenns of the assignment
to be unconscionable. In the absence ofunconscionability, the trial court cannot rewrite the
contract to make it more equitable just because the contractual provisions appear unwise or
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their enforcement may seem harsh. Lavey v. Regence Blueshield o.fIdaho, 139 Idaho 37, 42
(Idaho 2003)
However, Zebe made statements after November 4, 2009, to persons and entities
other than Clayson on which the trial court and Clayson rely to support an equitable remedy
against Zebe and Lawson. None of these statements is an Tmequivocaraffirmaiion that Zebe
and Lawson agreed to pay Clayson. None of these statements establish how much or for
what specific expenditures Clayson was to be reimbursed. None of the post November 4,
2009 statements were made to Clayson. (R. Vol. 4, pp. 735 - 736)
These statements do not create an equity obligation to reimburse Clayson. The only
way that these statements could give rise to an obligation to pay Clayson is if the statements
corroborate or confirm a contract to reimburse Clayson. A distinct understanding common
to both parties is necessary in order for a contract to exist. Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,
696 (Idaho 1992) The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual
assent by all the parties to all the tenns, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and
explicitly enough to show what the parties have agreed. State v. Korn, 224 P.3d 480, 482
(Idaho 2009)
There was never a mutual agreement about how much Clayson was to be paid so no
contract to do so came into existence. Clayson claims Zebe and Lawson agreed to reimburse
him approximately $130,000 for bills he paid. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 201 - 204) The bills listed on
the first page of Exhibit "F" do not total anything close to $130,000. Exhibit F totals
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$69,600. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 205 - 209) The bills Clayson could actually substantiate with a
check or credit card are a different amount, i.e. $97,310,24 which includes the $50,000 check
to Dairy Systems 2 • This is what the trial court detennined that Zebe and Lawson owed
Clayson. (R. Vol. 4, p. 740) None of the post-November 4, 2008 statements by Zebe even
mention a dollar am-ount. WhciJ was the-contract? Was it $130,000? Was it $69,600? Was
it $97,310.24?

Clayson never testified that there was a verbal agreement to pay him a

specific amount. Zebe and Lawson denied the existence of any such agreement. No
enforceable contract comes into being when parties leave a material term for future
negotiations, creating a mere agreement to agree.

Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable

Inv., LLC, 148 Idaho 616, 621 (Idaho 2010)
Zebe' s post-assignment statements did not corroborate or confirm a contract and give
rise to no legal or equitable obligation to reimburse Clayson.
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Clayson is absolutely correct that the prevailing party on this appeal should be entitled
to attorney fees pursuant to I. C. 12-120(3) because the gravaman of these claims involves
a commercial transaction. Zebe and Lawson have taken that position in their Appellant's
Brief on Appeal.

2

Clayson claimed more, but the trial court did not allow all the claimed expenses.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 8

However, Clayson is incorrect that this appeal is being pursued unreasonably and
without foundation. The issues presented by this appeal are not being pursued frivolously,
umeasonably and without foundation. An implied in fact contract requires performance at
another's request and nobody disputes that the refurbishment was not done at Zebe's or
Lawson's request. The trial <::ourt instead imposed an implied in fact contract to reimburse
Clayson from the circumstances surrounding his relinquishment of an interest in the purchase
agreement. Because that relinquishment was covered by the assignment, no equitable remedy
was appropriate. Furthermore, because Zehe and Lawson bought the property from a third
party after the improvements were made they paid for the improvements. They were not
unjustly enriched at Clayson's expense. This appeal presents valid and legitimate issues for
resolution on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Zehe and Lawson request this Court to reverse the judgment in favor of Clayson and
remand this matter for entry ofjudgment in favor of Zehe and Lawson finding that Clayson
failed to prove an implied-in-fact or implied-in-law contract for reimbursement. Zehe and
Lawson request their reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal.
DATED this

. °{'fl'-

_E day of July, 2011.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J q·fl'day of July, 2011, I served two copies of the

I hereby certify that on the
foregoing Appellants' Reply Brief to:

[v{

Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Hwy
Clifton, ID 83228

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

U.S. mail
Email: blake(@atkinlawoffices.net
Hand delivery
Fax: 801-533-0380

[/U.S. mail
[ ] Email: blake<@atkinlawoffices.net
[ ] Hand delivery
] Fax: 801-533-0380

Atkins Law Offices
837 South 500 West, Ste 200
Bountiful, UT 84010
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